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Recent years have seen a remarkable rise in public awareness of
consumer problems. In the past, the laissez faire, "let the buyer
beware" economic philosophy had been supported by laws that fa-
vored the businessman in most instances. Legislation on both federal
and state levels has reflected dramatic changes in this philosophy.
Among the most notable are the Truth-in-Lending Act,' the Motor
Vehicle Information & Cost Savings Act,2 the Fair Credit Reporting
Act,' the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,4 and consumer protection
legislation in many states.5 In addition, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion recently has proposed numerous rules regulating trade.'
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has provided much of the
impetus for this movement. Created by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act of 1905,7 the FTC was at first primarily concerned with
fostering competitive conditions among businessmen. Not until the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment8 in 1938 added the prohibition against un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices9 did protection of the consumer
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio; Chief, Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section.
** Assistant Attorney General, State of Ohio, Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section.
t 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-65 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1976), and "Regulation Z", 12
C.F.R. § 226 (1974), promulgated thereunder.
2 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-91 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
3 Id. § 1681-81t.
Id. § 2301-12 (Supp. 1976).
See Note, Consumer Protection by the State Attorneys General. A Time for Renewal,
49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 410, 411 (1973); note 49 infra.
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1976), the FTC may prescribe "rules
which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce . . . .Rules under this subparagraph may include requirements
prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices." Acting under this authority,
the FTC has proposed rules in numerous areas, including the hearing aid industry, health spas,
and the funeral industry. 40 Fed. Reg. 26645, 34615, 39901 (1975). Rules already adopted
regulate door-to-door sales, preserve consumers' defenses against holders of commercial paper,
and regulate the mail order industry. 16 C.F.R. §§ 429, 433, 435 (1976).
7 Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1905).
Ch. 49, 52 Stat. 114 (1938).
As amended, § 3(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1976) prohibits
"[uinfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce. ... The phrase "or affecting" was inserted by the
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Title 11 of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201(a) (1975).
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become a goal of the federal law. Since then, the FTC has led the
way by its emphasis on consumer problems. The FTC does not,
however, have infinite resources, nor did it until recently have juris-
diction over purely intrastate practices."0 It has, therefore, supported
the development and passage of state consumer legislation."
Many earlier state laws, including such Ohio statutes as those
prohibiting false advertising"2 and theft by deception, 3 carried crimi-
nal penalties. Even though the penalties involved were often minor,
a showing of fraud or criminal intent was required, with the attendant
difficulties of proof; coupled with the priorities of county prosecutors,
this naturally resulted in little enforcement. As recognition of the
problem grew, laws against deceptive consumer practices were passed
in state after state. 4
Forty-eight states now have some form of consumer protection
legislation. 5 In thirty-eight states the Attorney General has sole re-
sponsibility for administering the state's consumer protection pro-
gram."6 The advantages of placing the consumer protection function
in the office of a state's chief law enforcement officer are widely
recognized."'
I. THE PROBLEM
The image of business in the public mind is said to be at its
lowest ebb since the days of the robber baron. "In the popular view,
the typical industrialist pollutes the air, exploits the land, pays bribes,
and makes illegal campaign contributions; he wallows in exorbitant
profits; he treats his employees not as names but as numbers; he
generally can be found lobbying against any legislation for the com-
mon good."'" The Chamber of Commerce of the United States cites
20 Prior to passage of the FTC Improvement Act in 1975, the Commission's jurisdiction
was limited to practices "in commerce." See F.T.C. v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
" Speech by Dixon, Section 5 of the FTC Act and State Legislation Dealing with Decep-
tive Acts-Is There a Conflict?, in N.Y.B. ASS'N ANTITRUST L. SYMPOsIUM 76, 83 (1968).
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.41 (Page 1954), repealed and replaced by § 2913.02 (Page
1975).
23 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02(A)(3) (Page 1975).
2 See Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 729
(1972); note 49 infra.
11 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, PLACEMENT OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS (Febru-
ary 1976).
26 Id. at 3.
27 The Council on State Governments and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws have both recommended that the Attorney General alone have the respon-
sibilities for consumer protection. See Lovett, supra note 14, at 735.
20 NATION'S BUSINESS, April 1976, at 9.
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the estimate that there is "more crime committed against consumers
every day than there is crime in the streets. The public is constantly
being fleeced . . . ."" The Chamber reports that the annual cost of
deceptive practices and consumer fraud to consumer victims is 5.5
billion dollars .2 As long ago as 1969, Better Business Bureaus in
Ohio annually received 403,000 complaints and inquiries. 21 These
figures and statements demonstrate that self-regulation has not
worked-apparently because consumer fraud is enormously profit-
able.
Consumer problems and protection in Ohio were the objects of
study in 1970 by the Legislative Services Commission and the Joint
Committee of the General Assembly to Study Consumer Problems
and Protection. Their report was issued in January 1971 after an
analysis of over 436,000 consumer complaints and inquiries received
in 1969 by agencies responding to their survey.2 2 Inferior
merchandise, inadequate services, and abusive sales techniques were
responsible for most complaints. The services most complained of
were home improvements and automobile and appliance repair; the
abusive sales techniques most often complained of were misleading
advertising, telephone solicitation, and door-to-door sales techniques,
followed by bait-and-switch advertising and failure to honor warran-
ties.2n These problems are the ones most seen by the Attorney Gen-
eral and are typical of consumer complaints nationwide.24 Although
only in existence since October 1975, the Attorney General's Public
Action Line receives over 1,000 calls per month from throughout the
state. The need for effective mechanisms to deal with these problems
is well established.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTIVITIES IN OHIO
The Ohio Legislative Service Commission reported that the
most active consumer agencies in Ohio in 1969 were the Attorney
General's Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section, the Better Business
Bureaus, legal aid societies, municipal sealers of weights and mea-
sures, and private consumer organizations.21 In addition, county pros-
I CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 25
(1974).
I d. at 6.
21 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, CONSUMER PROBLEMS AND PROTECTION,
Report No. 101, at 4 (January 1971) [hereinafter cited as Report No. 101].
2 Id.
21 Id. at 6.
24 See DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS,
STATE CONSUMER ACTION, SUMMARY 1974 (DHEW Publication No. (OS) 75-116). See also
America's Angry Consumers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 10, 1976, at 56.
25 Report No. 101, supra note 21, at 2.
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ecutors and chambers of commerce had provided some consumer
protection efforts at the local level, and a number of Ohio cities had
established a formal office of consumer protection, usually under
either the health department or the department of weights and mea-
sures. Except for the Attorney General's Consumer Frauds and
Crimes Section, all of these agencies functioned at the local level and,
for the most part, lacked any real enforcement power. The exceptions
were prosecutions brought under criminal statutes and under con-
sumer protection ordinances in those few cities which had them.
The only formal statutory authority for the Consumer Frauds
and Crimes Section when it was established in 1963 was the Attorney
General's power as "chief law officer for the state and all its depart-
ments."2 Without statutory enforcement powers, the Section concen-
trated on coordinating information, resolving complaints, and work-
ing in cooperation with existing enforcement agencies-primarily the
FTC. It also undertook consumer education by means of an informa-
tion bulletin issued periodically. The Section attempted to resolve
complaints through contact with the business involved. If a complaint
indicated a violation of a law administered by a state agency, it was
referred to that agency; deceptive practices deemed to be within the
FTC's jurisdiction were referred to it. The centralized nature of a
state office enabled the staff to collect information on businesses or
types of practices occurring throughout the state and to supply such
information to local agencies and county prosecutors when appropri-
ate.27
The Joint Committee to Study Consumer Problems and Protec-
tion made a number of findings and recommendations in its 1971
report. It found that available consumer protection services and agen-
cies, including the Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the At-
torney General's Office, were "limited in their effectiveness because
of the lack of enforcement and investigatory powers necessary for
consumer protection."2 It recommended that a deceptive practices
law be enacted to "provide adequate means for Ohio consumers to
recover their losses from deceptive or misleading practices, and...
grant investigatory and enforcement powers to a state consumer
agency."2
The Committee recommended the Uniform Consumer Sales
25 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (Page Supp. 1976).
See Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds
and Crines Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General. 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 900-
01, 907 (1968).
2 See Report No. 101, supra note 21, at 44.
29 Id.
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Practices Act as a model for adoption in Ohio3" and the Attorney
General's Office as the appropriate administrative agency for its en-
forcement. It also recommended that the office be given the duty and
power to receive and act on consumer complaints, inform consumers
and suppliers of consumer goods and services of acts which violate
the deceptive practices law, engage in investigations as a result of
consumer complaints, conduct research, holds public hearings,
make inquiries relating to consumer complaints, and bring actions on
behalf of Ohio consumers for actual damages caused by deceptive
acts. "
The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, "an effort to crys-
tallize the best elements of contemporary federal and state regulation
of consumer protection in order to effectuate harmonization and
coordination of federal and state regulation,"3 became the basis for
House Bill 103, which originally placed the entire consumer protec-
tion function in the Attorney General's Office.3 Before final pas-
sage by the General Assembly in 1972, however, the bill was amended
to place various administrative responsibilities on the Department of
Commerce. Actual enforcement remained with the Attorney Gen-
eral, who was given subpoena powers in investigations requested by
the Director of the Department of Commerce, and power to bring
court actions. 4
Passage of the Consumer Sales Practices Act gave formal legis-
lative authority for initiation of enforcement actions by the Con-
sumer Frauds and Crimes Section. The Section maintained its earlier
activities of complaint handling, information coordination, and con-
sumer education. The complaint-handling function was greatly ex-
panded in 1975.
The top priority in the Section since 1972 has, of course, been
enforcement of the new law prohibiting deceptive and unconscionable
practices in consumer transactions.35 The fact of enforcement power
has affected the Section's relationships with other agencies.
Cooperation and coordination continues, but other agencies, both
state and local, now turn to the Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section
0 Id.
3 Id.
32 THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 257 (1973).
3 In the comment to § 2(2) of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, regarding
the "enforcing authority," the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
recommended the Attorney General as "the logical choice for designation as Enforcing Author-
ity lblecause The Enforcing Authority may frequently find it necessary to engage in litigation
." 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 231 (1976 Supp.).
S See note 112 infra and accompanying text.
See section 11. infra.
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for enforcement action when they observe violations of consumer
protection laws.
The Section currently has a total staff of forty persons under the
direction of the Section Chief. During 1975, eighty-seven proceedings
were initiated, 315 investigations undertaken, and over 3200 com-
plaints and inquiries processed. From 1972 to the end of 1975, the
Section brought 203 enforcement proceedings under the Consumer
Sales Practices Act. Of these, 172 have been concluded: eighty-one
by adjudicated court orders, sixty-four by consent judgments, and
twenty-seven by written assurances of voluntary compliance.
Including the sales volume of suppliers prohibited from doing busi-
ness as a result of court orders, the Section calculates a total mone-
tary benefit to consumers of $800,000 from its 1975 efforts.
Specialization in certain types of deceptive practices has devel-
oped among both attorneys and investigators in the Section. Experts
have emerged in home solicitation sales, pyramid sales schemes,
health spas, odometer roll-backs, hearing aid sales, mobile home
sales, and other areas of deceptive practices. When the Section has
proposed or supported legislation on one of these subjects, the attor-
ney with expertise in that area may be involved in drafting or prepar-
ing testimony in support of the legislation. Similarly, he may be
called upon to prepare comments for a proposed FTC rule in his area
of expertise.
The Section receives cases for investigation and enforcement
from several sources. Foremost among these until recently 6 has been
the Division of Consumer Protection of the Department of Com-
merce. The Consumer Sales Practices Act provides that the Director
of the Department of Commerce "may" request the Attorney Gen-
eral to investigate when he has probable cause to believe that a sup-
plier is violating the Act.17 Complaints also come from local con-
sumer protection agencies;" local Better Business Bureaus through-
out the State are especially helpful in providing complaints once an
investigation begins. 9 In addition, many complaints come to the
Section directly.
" Since enactment of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, the Director of the Department
of Commerce has referred a total of 194 cases to the Attorney General under § 1345.06 of the
Revised Code: 13 cases were referred in 1972, 54 cases in 1973, 77 cases in 1974 and 50 cases
were referred in 1975. No investigations have been referred by the Director of the Department
of Commerce since September 22, 1975.
SOHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (Page Supp. 1976).
Local agencies have been established under municipal ordinances in Cincinnati, Cleve-
land, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown. Several of these ordinances have been
patterned after Ohio's Consumer Sales Practices Act.
" Ohio cities in which Better Business Bureaus exist are Akron, Canton, Cincinnati,
Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Toledo, and Youngstown.
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Since deceptive advertising is one of the more severe consumer
problems in the state, the Section monitors a number of newspapers,
concentrating on different areas at different times. Some court
actions result from this review, which more often yields evidence for
existing investigations. In the same manner, personal observations of
the staff may result in investigations."
The Section also has initiated major investigations of deceptive
practices in areas where deception is widespread but proof is very
difficult to establish on the basis of individual consumer complaints.
These self-initiated investigations are designed to detect violations in
those technical areas in which consumers must rely upon services in
"blind faith" because they lack sufficient expertise to discover unlaw-
ful conduct. One such investigation, initiated in 1972, dealt with auto-
mobile repair and service problems." This resulted in enforcement
proceedings against eighteen automobile dealerships in 1974.
III. ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES
During the past four years, the Ohio General Assembly has given
the Attorney General statutory authority to enforce three major con-
sumer protection laws: the Consumer Sales Practices Act,42 the
Home Solicitation Sales Act,43 and the Anti-Pyramid Sales Act."
Each authorizes the Attorney General to stop violations of their pro-
visions through civil and, when appropriate, criminal actions.
A. Consumer Sales Practices Act
The Consumer Sales Practices Act, which became effective on
July 14, 1972, was the first comprehensive consumer protection law
enacted in Ohio. It prohibits a supplier from engaging in deceptive
or unconscionable sales practices in connection with a consumer
1. Several of the substantive rules adopted under the Consumer Sales Practices Act pro-
scribe certain advertising practices. See notes 57, 58, and 61 infra.
"1 Since 1971, consumers in Ohio and throughout the country have consistently com-
plained more about automobile sales, service, and warranties than about any other consumer
product. A nationwide compilation of consumer complaints received by state and local con-
sumer agencies in 1971 through 1974 showed that automobile complaints ranked first for each
year. In 1974, automobile complaints accounted for eighteen percent of the total complaints
received DHEW Publication, supra note 24, at 14-22. The Ohio Department of Commerce
listed automobile complaints as the highest ranking category, with 1,735 complaints out of a
total 7,488. 1975 OHio DEP'T OF COMMERCE ANN. REP. 7.
"z OHi-o REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01-.13 (Page Supp. 1976).
- Id. §§ 1345.21-.28.
44 Id. §§ 1333.91-.95, 1333.99.
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transaction, whether they occur "before, during, or after the transac-
tion."45
The scope of the Act is broad. A consumer transaction includes
a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an
item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, for purposes
that are primarily personal, family, or household." An actual sale,
lease, or other transfer is not an essential element in an action under
the Act since mere solicitation to supply any of these things is in-
cluded in the definition of "consumer transaction." Specifically ex-
cluded from the definition are transactions between attorney and
client or physician and patient, as well as transactions between finan-
cial institutions or public utilities and their customers. 7 One is a
"supplier" and thus subject to the Act if engaged in effecting or
soliciting consumer transactions whether or not he deals directly with
consumers.
4 8
By adopting the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act in Ohio,
the General Assembly rejected the approach taken by the majority
of other states, which have enacted consumer protection laws mod-
eled on the FTC Act.4 9 In addition to a general prohibition in the
Ohio Act against deceptive practices" similar to that contained in the
FTC Act, the General Assembly included ten specific acts which are
per se deceptive."' However, these specific prohibitions do not limit
the scope of the general prohibition, which can be developed through
judicial decisions and substantive rules adopted by the Director of the
Department of Commerce.5 2
Id. §§ 1345.02(A), 1345.03(A). See section IV.B.I. infra.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
17 Id. Although the Act's provisions do not protect consumers engaged in direct transac-
tions with these entities, the statute's prohibitions against deceptive or unconscionable conduct
do apply to these entities when they act on behalf of other "suppliers" who are subject to the
Act. For example, an attorney engaged in debt collection activity on behalf of a client supplier
is subject to enforcement action if his conduct violates the Act. See section IV.B.1. infra.
" Olo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(C) (Page Supp. 1976).
" Fifteen states have enacted a "Little FTC Act," which utilizes the broad language from
§ 5 of the FTC Act to prevent "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices." Fifteen states have adopted the Consumer Fraud Act, which applies to all forms of
deceptive trade practices. The remaining states have enacted the Deceptive Trade Practices Act
or the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act. To date, Utah is the only other state to adopt
the Uniform Act as its general consumer protection legislation. DHEW Publication No. (OS)
75-116, supra note 24, at 236-37. See also Note, Consumer Protection, supra note 5, at 415.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
'I Id. § 1345.02(B) prohibits particular conduct, including misrepresenting the perform-
ance characteristics, uses or benefits of a product (§ 1345.02(B)(1)), the standard, quality, or
grade of a product (§ 1345.02(B)(2)), the need for repair or replacement (§ 1345.02(B)(7)), and
the sponsorship, approval, or affiliation of a supplier who does not exist (§ 1345.02(B)(9)).
52 Id. § 1345.05(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1976).
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While the FTC Act declares "unfair and deceptive practices"
unlawful, the Uniform and Ohio Acts apply to "deceptive and un-
conscionable acts and practices." Although the Ohio Act does not
provide specific examples of unconscionable conduct as it does for
deception, the statute does enumerate specific circumstances which a
court must consider in determining whether an act or practice is
unconscionable. 53 Each of these circumstances requires the showing
of a knowing violation by the supplier. Under the statute, "knowl-
edge" means actual awareness, which may be inferred from objective
manifestations indicating that the supplier acted with such aware-
ness. 51 While this scienter requirement can be established by a sup-
plier's course of conduct, it does impose a greater burden of proof in
an action for unconscionable conduct than in an action for
deception.5" Since the statute contains only a general prohibition
against unconscionable acts, or practices, specific conduct will be de-
termined to be unconscionable only through judicial decisions and
substantive rules adopted by the Director of Commerce.
The statute authorizes the Director of Commerce to adopt sub-
stantive rules defining deceptive and unconscionable acts or prac-
tices."5 Twelve substantive rules have been adopted by the Depart-
ment of Commerce since 1972. Among other things, these rules cover
"fine print" exclusions and limitations in advertisements, 57 bait ad-
Id. § 1345.03(B) provides in pertinent part:
In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the following
circumstances shall be taken into consideration:
(1) Whether the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inabil-
ity of the consumer to protect his interests... ;
(2) Whether the supplier knew. . . the price was substantially in excess
of the price at which similar property or services were readily obtainable
(3) Whether the supplier knew . . . of the inability of the consumer to
receive a substantial benefit... ;
(4) Whether the supplier knew. . . that there was no reasonable proba-
bility of payment . . . by the consumer;
(5) Whether the supplier required the consumer to enter into a con-
sumer transaction on terms the supplier knew were substantially one-sided in
favor of the supplier;
(6) Whether the supplier knowingly made a misleading statement of
opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to his detriment.
' Id. § 1345.01(E).
5' See section lV.B.l. infra.
-OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B)(2) (Page Supp. 1976).
51 Substantive rule COcp-3-01.02, Exclusions and Limitations in Advertisements (May I,
1975) provides in pertinent part:
It is a deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction for a
supplier, in the sale or offering for sale of goods or services, to make any offer in
written or printed advertising or promotional literature without stating clearly and
conspicuously in close proximity to the words stating the offer any material exclu-
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vertising,58 deceptive practices in the repair and services industries, 9
failure to deliver goods,"0 and use of deceptive price comparisons.6
sions, reservations, limitations, modifications, or conditions. Disclosure shall be eas-
ily legible to anyone reading the advertising or promotional literature and shall be
sufficiently specific so as to leave no reasonable probability that the terms of the offer
might be misunderstood.
11 Substantive rule COcp-3-01.03, Bait Advertising (June 5, 1973) provides in pertinent
part:
A. It shall be a deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction
for a supplier to sell goods or services when the offer is not a bona fide effort to sell
the advertised goods or services.
I. An offer is not bona fide when a supplier uses a statement or illustration
in any advertisement which would create in the mind of a reasonable con-
sumer a false impression of the grade, quality, quantity, make, value, model
year, size, color, usability, or origin of the goods and services offered or which
otherwise misrepresents the goods or services in such a manner that, on
subsequent disclosure or discovery of the true facts, the consumer is switched
from the advertised goods or services to other goods or services. An offer is
not bona fide, even though the true facts are made known to the consumer
before he views the advertised goods or services, if the first contact or inter-
view is secured by deception.
2. An offer is not bona fide if a supplier discourages the purchase of the
advertised goods or services in order to sell other goods or services.
5, Substantive rule COcp-3-01.04, Repairs and Services (June 5, 1973), among other things
requires a supplier to provide in advance to a consumer when the cost of anticipated repairs
exceeds twenty-five dollars a written estimate of the cost of such repairs; obtain oral or written
authorization for additional, unforeseen, but necessary repairs if such exceed the original
estimate by 10% or more; tender to the consumer any replaced parts unless such parts are to
be rebuilt or sold by the supplier and the consumer is informed of this intended reuse prior to
receipt of the original estimate. The rule also prohibits a supplier from charging for repairs
which have not yet been authorized, from representing that repairs have been performed when
they have not, and from failing to provide the consumer with an itemized list of repairs
performed, and the reason for such repairs.
11 Substantive rule COcp-3-01.09, Failure to Deliver-Substitution of Goods (June 5,
1973), known as the "Eight-Week Rule," provides in pertinent part:
A. It shall be a deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction
for a supplier:
1. To advertise or promise prompt delivery unless, at the time of the adver-
tising, the supplier has taken reasonable action to insure prompt delivery;
2. To accept money from a consumer for goods ordered by mail, telephone,
or otherwise and then permit eight weeks to elapse without:
a. Making shipment or delivery of the goods ordered;
b. Making a full refund;
c. Advising the consumer of the duration of an extended delay and
offering to send him a refund within two weeks if he so requests; or
d. Furnishing similar goods of equal or greater value as a good faith
substitute.
Il Substantive rule COcp-3-01.12, which applies to price comparisons, became effective
August I, 1975. The rule covers out-of-store advertising:
[It] stems from the general principle, codified in Ohio Revised Code Section
1345.02(B), that it is deceptive for any claimed savings, discount, bargain, or sale
not to be genuine, for the prices which are the basis of such comparisons not to be
bona fide, genuine prices, and for out-of-store advertisements which indicate price
comparisons to create false expectations in the minds of consumers.
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The rules that have been adopted under the Act define conduct that
is deceptive and in violation of Revised Code § 1345.02(A). Yet to
be developed are rules which expand upon the general prohibition
against unconscionable acts or practices found in Revised Code
§ 1345.03(A).
The Consumer Sales Practices Act provides that when public
enforcement action is warranted, the Attorney General may bring
civil actions on his own initiative or upon the request of the Director
of the Department of Commerce, for declaratory or injunctive re-
lief." Since the Act specifically authorizes the imposition of a tempo-
rary or permanent injunction, the traditional equitable prerequisites
of irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at law need not be
present-a showing that the defendant supplier has engaged in decep-
tive or unconscionable practices is sufficient.13 A supplier who vio-
lates a temporary or permanent injunction is subject to a civil penalty
of not more than $5,000 for each day of the violation. 4 Although a
consent judgment is not evidence of illegal conduct, disregard of the
terms of a consent judgment is treated as a violation of an injunction
and subjects the offending supplier to this civil penalty for contempt. 5
A special provision in the Act authorizes the Attorney General
to seek restitution for consumers in an injunctive action. Under Re-
vised Code § 1345.07(B), the Attorney General may request appropri-
ate orders from a court, including the appointment of a receiver and
the sequestration of a defendant's assets for the purpose of reimburs-
ing consumers. While the Act specifically authorizes the Attorney
General to initiate class actions on behalf of consumers damaged by
violations," the goal of a class action suit can be accomplished with-
The rule regulates representations regarding the "character" of a supplier, comparisons with
his own prices and those of others, comparisons with nonidentical goods, price reductions for
special circumstances, and advance or introductory sales.
" OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
State v. Alexander Bros., Inc., 43 Ohio App. 2d 154, 334 N.E.2d 492 (Ct. App. 1974).
In this case, the lower court denied injunctive relief authorized by a specific statute on the
ground that there was no showing of irreparable injury. The court of appeals reversed and held:
Where an injunction is authorized by statute and the statutory conditions are
satisfied, the usual grounds for injunctive relief need not be established. For example,
where a statute regulates a certain business and provides that an injunction may be
granted to enforce the law, the party who seeks an injunction need not show irrepara-
ble injury or that he has no adequate remedy at law, where the statute authorizing
an injunction does not place such limitations upon the granting of relief.
45 Ohio App. 2d at 155, 334 N.E.2d at 493.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1976).
0 Id. § 1345.07(E). See section IV.D. infra.
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07(A) (Page Supp. 1976). Individual consumers under
certain circumstances may also file class actions to recover actual damages pursuant to Revised
Code § 1345.09(B).
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out meeting the notice requirements of a class action by using the
"appropriate orders" provision in an injunctive action. Under this
procedure individual consumers who have been damaged may present
their claims to a master appointed by the court, and thus save the
court's time.
B. Home Solicitaion Sales Act
Since January 1, 1973, the Home Solicitation Sales Act has
given Ohio consumers an absolute three-day right to cancel contracts
resulting from home solicitation sales. The law was amended in 1974
to conform to an FTC rule governing door-to-door sales and to
strengthen the rights of Ohio consumers. 7 Both the Act and the FTC
rule authorize cancellation of a contract subject to their coverage
until midnight of the third business day following execution of the
contract."
As a result of the 1974 amendments, the Ohio Act has a broader
scope than the FTC rule." The definition of "home solicitation sale"
now includes all sales of consumer goods or services costing twenty-
five dollars or more that are solicited at the residence of the
buyer-including those in response to an invitation by the buyer-or
in which the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place
other than the seller's "place of business."70 The "place of business"
is defined as the main office or a permanent branch office or perma-
nent local address of the seller.7' Thus sales at temporary booths,
shopping centers, or fairs are subject to cancellation by the buyer.
The Act also provides that every home solicitation sale must be evi-
denced by a writing signed by both buyer and seller containing notice
of the right to cancel in specific language prescribed by the statute.72
61 See Tongren & Olson, Revisions in Ohio's Door-to-Door Sales Law, 48 Ono BAR 387
(1975).
" Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.22 (Page Supp. 1976); 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1976).
" The FTC rule's definition of door-to-door sales excludes transactions "[c]onducted and
consummated entirely by mail or telephone; and without any other contact between the buyer
and the seller or its representative prior to delivery of the goods or performance of the services."
16 C.F.R. § 429.1, note l(a)(4) (1976). Revised Code § 1345.21(A)(2), however, narrows this
provision to exclude such transactions only "if initiated by the buyer." The significance of this
difference and its beneficial effect for Ohio consumers was pointed out in Brown v. Periodical
Publishers Serv. Bureau, No. 75CV-05-1977 (C.P. Franklin Cty. May 26, 1976). In granting
the Attorney General's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, the court's opinion, at 3,
stated that the Ohio "Legislature chose to limit the telephone sales exclusion to only those
transactions initiated by the buyer and, therefore, to extend protection of the Home Solicitation
Sales Act to buyers in telephone transactions initiated by the seller."
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.21(A) (Page Supp. 1976).
71 Id. § 1345.21(H).
72 Id. §§. 1345.23(B)(I)-(2).
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Until these requirements are met the buyer may cancel at any time.73
A seller may not fail or refuse to honor any valid cancellation and
must, within ten days of its receipt, refund all payments and cancel
all indebtedness in connection with the sale. 74
The Attorney General's enforcement authority under the Home
Solicitation Sales Act is the same as under the Consumer Sales Prac-
tices Act, since a failure to comply with the Act constitutes a decep-
tive practice in connection with a consumer transaction, in violation
of Revised Code § 1345.02.15 An injunction accompanied by restitu-
tion and other corrective action is the usual relief sought.7 The Act
also provides a criminal penalty for failure to provide the prescribed
notice of the buyer's right to cancel and to perform other affirmative
duties imposed by the statute.7 7 These violations are punishable as
minor misdemeanors. The Attorney General has also brought crimi-
nal actions against sellers pursuant to his authority under Revised
Code § 109.16.78
C. Anti-Pyramid Sales Act
Prior to 1974, the Attorney General brought enforcement ac-
tions against pyramid sales schemes under the referral selling prohibi-
tion of the Consumer Sales Practices Act.7" These civil injunctive
actions were ineffective and pyramid schemes continued to flourish
-= Id. § 1345.23(C). The three-day cancellation period established under Revised Code
§ 1345.22 begins to run only after the seller has provided a written contract containing the
statutory notice of the buyer's right to cancel. Therefore, the Attorney General seeks court-
ordered notification to all buyers of their cancellation rights in enforcement actions against a
seller for his wholesale failure to comply with the notice requirements of Revised Code
§§ 1345.23(B)(I)-(2).
7, Id. § 1345.23(D)(4)(a)-(c).
15 Id. § 1345.28. Substantive rule COcp-3-91.11 (June 5, 1973), dealing with direct solicita-
tions, also provides that failure to conform to the requirements of the Home Solicitation Sales
Act is deceptive.
7, See note 73 supra.
I d. § 1345.99.
7' See section IV.C. infra.
SOHito REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(C) (Page Supp. 1976) provides:
No supplier shall offer to a consumer or represent that a consumer will receive
a rebate, discount, or other benefit as an inducement for entering into a consumer
transaction in return for giving the supplier the names of prospective consumers, or
otherwise helping the supplier to enter into other consumer transactions, if earning
the benefit is contingent upon an event occurring after the consumer enters into the
transaction.
Ohio courts have applied this prohibition to pyramid sales schemes. In Brown v. Source
Motivation, Inc., No. 72CV-09-2970 (C.P. Franklin Cty., October 17, 1972), an action under
the Consumer Sales Practices Act, the court held that Revised Code § 1345.02(C) was disposi-
tive of the pyramid issue. Accord, Brown v. Holiday Magic, Inc., No. 72CV-12-3807 (C.P.
Franklin Cty., July 3, 1975).
594 37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 581 (1976)
in Ohio. The Anti-Pyramid Sales Act was enacted to solve this prob-
lem. It prohibits any scheme by which one pays "consideration" for
the opportunity to receive "compensation" for introducing another
person into the program or after another participant has introduced
a person into the program. 8 This provision is narrowed by the defini-
tion of "consideration,"'" which excludes payment for sales demon-
stration materials as well as annual administrative fees up to twenty-
five dollars, and the definition of "compensation, ' ' 2 which excludes
payments received for sales to persons who are not purchasing in
order to become participants in the plan or program.
The Act prohibits any person from proposing, planning,
preparing, or operating a pyramid sales plan,83 and empowers the
Attorney General to bring injunctive action against virtually all per-
sons involved from the inception of the scheme. A civil penalty of up
to $5000 per day may be imposed for violation of an injunction. 4 All
contracts in violation of the Act are void.85 In addition, an individual
who has paid "consideration" in order to participate in a pyramid
scheme may recover his consideration plus attorneys' fees in a civil
action against "any" participant who received compensation as a
result of that individual's introduction into the scheme.
The Anti-Pyramid Sales Act also contains criminal penalties. 6
If the amount of compensation received by a participant in connec-
tion with a violation of the Act is less than $150, the offense is a
misdemeanor of the first degree. If the compensation is $150 or more,
or if the offender has a previous conviction under the statute, the
offense is a felony of the fourth degree. As under the Home Solicita-
tion Sales Act, the Attorney General may bring civil and criminal
actions against pyramid sales schemes.
IV. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section initiated a total of
239 enforcement proceedings between July 14, 1972 and June 1, 1976
under the three statutes discussed above. The goals of these enforce-
ment actions are to eliminate deceptive and unconscionable sales
practices from the marketplace, to remove financial incentives for
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.9 1(A) (Page Supp. 1976). A plan or program is covered
whether or not it includes disposal or distribution of personal or real property.
81 Id. § 1333.91(C).
'z Id. § 1333.91(B).
Id. § 1333.92.
Id. § 1333.94.
Id. § 1333.93.
' Id. § 1333.99(G).
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suppliers to engage in such practices, and to provide restitution to
injured customers.
A. Enforcement Policy
The prospect of being enjoined from future violations of the law
creates little incentive for voluntary compliance among suppliers who
are profiting from deceptive tactics. The General Assembly was
aware that simply outlawing deceptive and unconscionable sales prac-
tices would not stop them, so long as suppliers could keep the profits
from their illegal practices. Accordingly, the consumer's right to be
reimbursed for damages suffered as a result of a supplier's unlawful
sales practices is an integral part of the enforcement mechanisms of
these laws. The Section also requires a mechanism for assuring con-
tinued compliance once enforcement proceedings have been con-
cluded. Both of these forms of corrective action are regularly incorpo-
rated in the court orders or consent judgments that result from en-
forcement actions. The judgment entry includes a complaint resolu-
tion procedure which must be followed by the defendant, with speci-
fied time periods and reporting requirements. In many instances an
escrow fund is required to assure reimbursement to consumers under
the procedure. Defendants are also required to maintain appropriate
records and to make them available for inspection by the Attorney
General.
The Section continually monitors suppliers' compliance with all
court ordered relief, including complaint resolution and record-
keeping procedures. The $5,000 per day contempt penalty has been
an effective weapon against those defendants who fail to comply with
court imposed requirements. 7
Certain general enforcement priorities have developed in the
Section through its experience with consumer problems. Because of
the large sums of money involved and the speed with which multi-
level pyramid schemes grow, injunctions are sought as quickly as
possible after the schemes are identified. The sixteen pyramid
Id. § 1345.07(A)(1). In Brown v. Introductions International, Inc., No. 74-2529 (C.P.
Lucas Cty., September 29, 1975), the court ordered the defendants to establish an elaborate
complaint resolution procedure and provide periodic reports of compliance to the Attorney
General. In a subsequent contempt action, the court found that none of the defendants at-
tempted to comply with its order and held them in contempt for a continuing period of 114
days. The court's entry of March 22, 1976, permanently enjoined the defendants from engaging
in consumer transactions in Ohio and imposed a total civil penalty of 1.7 million dollars upon
them. State v. Happy People's Club, No. 35-299 (Columbus Mun. Ct., October 28, 1975). See
also Brown v. Check Enterprises, Inc., No. 74 CV-07-2667 (C.P. Franklin Cty., August 20,
1975), a contempt action in which the court prohibited the defendants "from doing business in
the State of Ohio."
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schemes that have been enjoined to date took over twenty-five million
dollars from 9000 Ohio consumers before being stopped. Injunctive
relief under the Anti-Pyramid Sales Act usually includes an injunc-
tion against enforcing or assigning any contracts made in violation
of the Act. The provision declaring all these contracts void can bring
a pyramid enterprise to an abrupt demise.
Investigations of industries in which consumers, for want of
technical knowledge, must totally rely on suppliers' representations
have a very high priority in the Section. In addition to the automobile
repair project, an extensive investigation to detect and enjoin odome-
ter rollbacks recently led to the initiation of lawsuits against more
than twenty automobile dealers in Ohio.
Actions against suppliers of goods or services that are expensive
and of little or no benefit to the consumer are also given high priority.
These have included actions against basement waterproofers, home
remodelers, pest control services, and furnace repair companies. Typ-
ically these transactions involve hundreds of dollars, often for a serv-
ice that was either unnecessary or improperly performed.
Consistent with the statutory prohibition against the Director of
the Department of Commerce revealing the names of suppliers under
investigation," the Attorney General does not disclose the name of a
supplier under investigation until the filing of a lawsuit or the accept-
ance of an assurance of voluntary compliance. The fact of the investi-
gation is then a matter of public records. Premature disclosure of the
identity of a businessman under investigation could harm the reputa-
tion of a legitimate business.
B. Significant Decisions
1. Deceptive and Unconscionable Practices
The Consumer Sales Practices Act contemplates that specific
practices in addition to the ten enumerated in Revised Code
§ 1345.02(B)s9 will be determined by the courts to be deceptive under
Revised Code § 1345.02(A), or unconscionable under § 1345.03(A) of
the Code. Since the type of relief available in private actions under
the Act can depend upon the existence of previous judicial determina-
tions of this nature," the Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section seeks
s OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(A)(7) (Page Supp. 1976).
See note 51 supra.
90 Individual actions for actual damages or a minimum recovery of $100 are authorized if
the violation was an act or practice previously determined by a court to violate the general
prohibitions of deceptive or unconscionable acts or practices in Revised Code §§ 1345.02(A)
and 1345.03(A). Id. § 1345.09. Private class actions are also authorized for such violations. Id.
§ 1345.09(B).
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to obtain favorable and innovative judicial precedent in order to ex-
pand the list of specific deceptive and unconscionable practices and
thus to increase the importance of the private action. Although the
Act is barely four years old, the body of case law is already growing.
In Brown v. Market Development, Inc.," the defendant, an Ohio
resident, was charged with sending deceptive sales literature to con-
sumers in other states. The defendant had previously agreed to an
injunction against similar acts practiced on Ohio consumers. 2 In
overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
the court held that the residence of the consumer was not determina-
tive, and that the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act is intended to
prohibit deceptive and unconscionable acts and practices by Ohio
suppliers regardless of where the consumers reside. The court con-
cluded that the Act is remedial and not penal in nature and must be
liberally construed pursuant to Revised Code § 1.11.13
Brown v. Lyons 4 was an action against a dealer in used appli-
ances who concealed his real identity from consumers by using ficti-
tious names, frequently changing" the names and addresses under
which he did business, failing to answer his business phones, and
failing to return calls to consumers. He also sold defective products
and failed to honor warranties. The court concluded that the defen-
dant had maintained a pattern of incompetency and continually
evaded his legal obligations to consumers,' 5 and held that this was
[a]n unconscionable act and practice in violation of . . . R.C.
1345.03(A), providing an adequate legal basis for the award to the
consumer of punitive damages in an action where such damages
have been requested from the court."
The court also held specifically that three of the circumstances
considered by the court were each an unconscionable act and practice
in violation of Revised Code § 1345.03.11 It added that failure to
" 68 Ohio Op. 2d 276, 322 N.E.2d 367 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1974).
1Z Brown v. Market Development, Inc., No. A-728958 (C.P. Hamilton Cty., December
15, 1972).
Otio REv. CODE ANN. § 1.11 (Page 1969) provides in pertinent part:
Remedial laws and all proceedings under them shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining justice. The rule of
common law that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly con-
strued has no application to remedial laws ....
"1 43 Ohio Misc. 14, 332 N.E.2d 380 (C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1974).
'5 Id. at 18, 332 N.E.2d at 384.
I d. at 21, 332 N.E.2d at 386. The court awarded punitive damages in the amount of
$250 to each of the private consumers who participated as plaintiff-intervenors in the action.
" Id. The court held that knowingly taking advantage of the liability of the consumer to
reasonably protect his interests (§ 1345.03(B)(1)), entering into a transaction knowing of the
inability of the consumer to receive a substantial benefit from the transaction (§ 1345.03(B)(3)),
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meet both express and implied warranties was a deceptive practice
under Revised Code § 1345.02(A), and further that failure to supply
either goods or services or to offer a refund within a reasonable length
of time after accepting money is deceptive.9"
In Brown v. Bredenbeck,"9 the defendant had solicited and ac-
cepted paid subscriptions for a monthly magazine and failed to re-
fund money when it suspended publication after three issues. He
contended that there was no deceptive practice because his failure was
caused by economic factors and because he had no intent to deceive
consumers. The court held that
common law intent to deceive is not a prerequisite to violation of
the Consumer Sales Practices Act. . . To violate the Consumer
Sales Practices Act all that is necessary is for the supplier to make
a representation which has no basis in fact. His knowledge or intent
at the time he makes the representation is immaterial.'
The opinion went on to hold that a representation is deceptive if it is
likely to induce in the mind of the consumer a belief which is not in
accord with the facts. 01 The court thus adopted the definition of
"deceptive practice" found in the comments to the Uniform Con-
sumer Sales Practices Act.'
These cases have gone far to establish that failure to deliver
within a reasonable time is a deceptive practice, regardless of the
supplier's intent. In addition, the court in Brown v. Cole"3 held that
a supplier who accepts money for goods or services, knowing that
they will not be delivered, commits an unconscionable act and prac-
tice in violation of Revised Code § 1345.03(A).0 4
In Liggins v. The May Company,"5 the court confronted the
and knowingly making a statement or opinion upon which a consumer is likely to rely to his
detriment (§ 1345.03(B)(6)) were each an unconscionable act or practice in violation of Revised
Code § 1345.03(A).
IS Id. at 19-20, 332 N.E.2d at 385. See note 60 supra.
o No. 74CV-09-3493 (C.P. Franklin Cty., July 24, 1975).
Id. at 3.
101 Id. at 4.
102 The Official Comment to § 3(a) of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, which
contains the prohibition against deceptive acts or practices, provides:
This subsection forbids deceptive advertising, deceptive statements made when
goods are delivered, and deceptive statements made in connection with debt collec-
tion. A deceptive act or practice has the likelihood of inducing a state of mind in
the consumer that is not in accord with the facts. It is immaterial whether this
capacity to mislead arises from a verbal, written, or graphic misrepresentation or a
nondisclosure by a supplier.
7 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 232 (1976 Supp.).
" No. 75-579 (C.P. Richland Cty., January 16, 1976).
I Id. at 4.
"' 44 Ohio Misc. 81, 337 N.E.2d 816 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty. 1975).
CONSUMER PROTECTION
question of the Consumer Sales Practices Act's coverage of debt
collection practices in connection with a consumer transaction. The
defendant collection agency moved to dismiss, claiming that the Act
confers no jurisdiction over debt collection practices and that it was
not a "supplier" under the Act. The court held that the supplier-
consumer relationship continues from the inception of the transaction
until the debt is fully paid, that an assignment of the collection of the
debt is part of the consumer transaction, and that a person attempt-
ing to enforce the payment of the debt is thus a supplier for purposes
of the Act.106 In its opinion, the court construed the provision in
Revised Code § 1345.02(A) that a "deceptive act or practice by a
supplier violates this section whether it occurs before, during or after
the transaction." The comment to that provision in the Uniform
Consumer Sales Practices Act also states that it applies to deceptive
statements made in connection with debt collection.1 7
In another private action, Santiago v. S. S. Kresge Co.,,"8 the
court agreed with the Liggins decision and went on to address the
"distant forum abuse" alleged by the complaints of the consumer and
the Attorney General:
This alarming practice consists of suing persons on small al-
leged consumer debts in a forum far from the consumer's home and
far from the place where the claim arose, with the result that default
judgments are obtained . . . . [It) denies the consumer a day in
court to contest the claim-a right that is the basis of our legal
system. Due to the distance of the forum from the consumer's resi-
dence and the expense of defending, the creditor easily obtains de-
fault judgments and the consumer is prevented from raising defenses
or contesting the claim. 0'
For these reasons the court found that it is an unconscionable sales
practice for a supplier to sue a consumer in a jurisdiction other than
that where the consumer resides or where the transaction took
place."0 It also granted the Attorney General's motion to intervene,
holding that the intervention authorized by Revised Code
§ 1345.10(B) is as of right under rule 24(A) of the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure. " '
IN Id. at 83, 337 N.E.2d at 818.
' See note 100 supra.
WA No. 948069 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty., March 4, 1976).
" Id. at 3. The court also stated that the distant forum practice
takes oppressive advantage of the consumer and forces the consumer into a one-sided
situation where the odds are unconscionably stacked against him. It abuses the legal
system in order to deny Ohio consumers a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and
offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
M Id. at 4.
M" Id. at I.
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2. Procedures and Remedies
Revised Code § 1345.06 sets forth at length the powers of the
Attorney General in investigations requested by the Director of the
Department of Commerce. In Brown v. Bill Garlic Motors, Inc.,"'
the court affirmed that the Attorney General also had independent
investigative authority under the Consumer Sales Practices Act."'
It also held that proof of the rolling back of even one automobile
odometer is sufficient to invoke the powers of the court.
Section 1345.07(B) of the Revised Code provides that in an
action for injunctive relief a court may issue orders for restitution,
the appointment of a master, and other "appropriate orders." An
example of the appropriate orders provision is found in Brown v. Joe
Schott Chevrolet, Inc."4 After a trial on the merits, the court found
that the defendant had charged for performing unnecessary repairs,
charged for repairs which were not performed, performed defective
repairs, failed to provide a written estimate in advance, and failed to
tender replaced parts.1 The court enjoined these violations, ordered
the supplier to establish and implement a quality control procedure
to oversee its automobile repairs, and authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to establish a compliance review program of the defendant's
repair work, such as consumer transaction test checks of the defen-
dant or the inspection of the records required to be kept by the
defendant under the court's entry.
Injunctive relief against a corporation engaging in deceptive
practices is often of little value where the corporation is controlled
by a few individuals who can simply form a new corporation and
proceed with the same deceptive practice. Therefore, the Consumer
Frauds and Crimes Section attempts to ensure that the responsible
individuals as well as the corporation are enjoined from future viola-
tions, in either adjudicated court orders or consent judgments. The
largest contempt fine ordered by a court to date under the Consumer
Sales Practices Act, 1.7 million dollars, was imposed jointly and
112 No. 40780 (C.P. Huron Cty., February 4, 1976). The defendant asserted that because
the statute describes only those investigations requested by the Director of the Department of
Commerce, the Attorney General is precluded from initiating investigations. The Court held
that the provision in Revised Code § 1345.07(A) that "the Attorney General may, and in
consumer transaction cases referred to him by the Division of Commerce, shall" bring actions
for violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act (emphasis added) establishes the Attorney
General's independent authority to investigate alleged violations of the law and bring appropri-
ate actions.
"I Of the 239 enforcement proceedings brought by the Attorney General since 1972, 141
resulted from investigations initiated by the Office.
"' No. A7510051 (C.P. Hamilton Cty., April 29, 1976).
UI Id. at 2-3.
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severally upon the corporate defendant and its individual owner.,
Piercing the corporate veil is based on the individual's knowl-
edge, control, or authorization of illegal practices, which are grounds
under Ohio case law for finding individual responsibility.117 In Brown
v. Cole,"' the court found this control and held the individual owners
to be suppliers who had committed deceptive and unconscionable
acts. The defendants were enjoined from further violations and or-
dered to make restitution to consumers.
Revised Code § 1345.06119 provides for a request of a written
assurance of voluntary compliance and a thirty-day waiting period
for response prior to filing an action in court, except that "where an
injunction is the only. relief sought, such thirty-day period does not
apply." The effect of these clauses has been at issue in several cases.
At first the Attorney General would sue for injunctive relief against
alleged violators and subsequently request a written assurance of
voluntary compliance within thirty days. If a voluntary assurance was
not obtained within that time period, the Attorney General would
move for additional relief such as the appointment of a master and
restitution to identifiably injured consumers.
This approach was rejected in Brown v. Town & Country Auto
Sales, Inc.2 0 After the trial court had issued a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, the defendant asserted that the
written request for voluntary compliance must be sent 30 days before
"I See Brown v. Introductions International, Inc., No. 74-2529 (C.P. Lucas Cty., Septem-
ber 29, 1975). Although the owner and operator of the defendant corporation was not named
as a separate defendant, the court's injunctive order applied to the defendant corporation and
its officers. In the subsequent contempt action, the court found the individual owner in con-
tempt and imposed a $570,000 civil penalty upon him.
"I State v. Stemen, 90 Ohio App. 309, 106 N.E.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 949 (1952).
,t No. 75-579 (C.P. Richland Cty., January 16, 1976).
"' OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.06 (Page Supp. 1976) provides
If, by his own inquiries or as a result of complaints, the director of commerce
has probable cause to believe that a supplier has engaged, is engaging, or preparing
to engage, in an act or practice that violates sections 1345.01 to 1345.13 of the
Revised Code, he may request the attorney general to investigate. For this purpose
the attorney general may administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, adduce evidence and
require the production of relevant matter.
The attorney general may terminate an investigation under this section upon
acceptance of a written assurance of voluntary compliance from a supplier suspected
of violation. Unless there is reason to believe that the supplier has or is about to
remove himself or any of his property from the state, the attorney general shall
request such an assurance from the supplier, in writing, at least thirty days prior to
commencing an action under section 1345.09 of the Revised Code. Where an injunc-
tion is the only relief sought, such thirty day period does not apply. . . . [Emphasis
added].
10 43 Ohio App. 2d 119, 334 N.E.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1974).
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filing any action in which more than injunctive relief is sought. The
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's dis-
missal of that part of the complaint which sought other than injunc-
tive relief."' The court held, however, that the Attorney General
could pursue an injunctive action'2 without having made such a re-
quest.
The next position taken by the Attorney General's Office was
that the requirement of a "thirty-day request" in Revised Code
§ 1345.06 applied only in investigations requested under that section
by the Director of the Department of Commerce-the only type of
investigation to which the language "an investigation under this sec-
tion" applied."2 This approach was rejected in four cases consoli-
dated in the Montgomery County Court of Appeals. 4 The court also
rejected the conclusion in Town & Country Auto Sales, and held that
the provision in Revised Code § 1345.06 that "[w]here an injunction
is the only relief sought, such thirty-day period does not apply," does
not eliminate the requirement of a written request for voluntary com-
pliance, but only removes the thirty-day waiting period.'2
Although they reached different conclusions, these two appellate
courts have emphasized "the anti-litigious objective sought to be ac-
complished" and the "legislative preference for voluntary rather than
court-ordered compliance"' 121 with the Consumer Sales Practices Act.
It remains to be seen how this emphasis on voluntary compliance will
be reconciled with conclusions like that of Judge Black of the Hamil-
ton County Court of Common Pleas that "the Act is intended to
prohibit (and to provide civil remedies to enforce the prohibition of)
deceptive and unconscionable acts and practices by Ohio suppliers in
connection with consumer transactions ... ,"127 Making a written
request for voluntary compliance a prerequisite to a temporary re-
straining order is incongruous, especially when egregious violations
are occurring.
,21 Although the defendant moved for a dismissal of the entire action, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's action of dismissing only the Attorney General's request for a declara-
tory judgment and motion for restitution which had been filed more than thirty days subsequent
to the commencement of the lawsuit. Id. at 121, 334 N.E.2d at 490.
,2 Id. at 123, 334 N.E.2d at 491.
m See note 119 supra.
2 Brown v. Borchers Ford, Inc., No. 5015, Brown v. White-Allen Chevrolet, Inc., No.
5016, Brown v. Jack Becker, No. 5017, and Brown v. T.D. & P.A. Peffley, Inc., No. 5018 (Ct.
App. Montgomery Cty., April 8, 1976).
'2 Id. at 3.
121 Id. at 4.
"2 Brown v. Market Development, Inc., 68 Ohio Op. 2d 276, 278, 322 N.E.2d 367, 368
(C.P. Hamilton Cty. 1974).
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C. Criminal Actions
In order to effectively deter prospective violators, the Consumer
Frauds and Crimes Section recently has invoked the Attorney Gen-
eral's authority under Revised Code § 109.16121 to seek criminal sanc-
tions against violators of the Home Solicitation Sales Act and the
Anti-Pyramid Sales Act. A prosecution stemming from a single
transaction can result in a criminal conviction on a number of counts,
with the imposition of a fine for each count. For example, failure to
provide the proper notice of cancellation with a home solicitation
sales contract, failure to inform a buyer orally of his right to cancel,
failure to refund money, and negotiation of a note or other evidence
of indebtedness withii five days, each a criminal violation, could all
occur in connection with a single home solicitation sale. The Attorney
General has brought four such criminal actions thus far: three under
the Home Solicitation Sales Act' and one under the Anti-Pyramid
Sales Act. 3' Two of these have resulted in convictions . 3' The threat
of a criminal conviction should encourage voluntary compliance with
consumer protection laws.
D. Consent Judgments Illustrating Enforcement Policies
Whenever an enforcement proceeding is concluded by a consent
judgment, the Consumer Sales Practices Act mandates that the judg-
ment provide "appropriate corrective action," and provides that the
Attorney General may condition acceptance of an assurance of vol-
untary compliance on the supplier's agreement to undertake such
action . 32 Typically, a wide range of compliance mechanisms are
included in consent judgments obtained under the Act.
The most important feature of a consent judgment is restitution
to defrauded consumers. Nearly every consent judgment resulting
from the Attorney General's enforcement actions contains a com-
plaint resolution procedure which must be followed by the defendant.
Time periods are established within which the defendant must resolve
consumer complaints and report the resolution to the Attorney Gen-
123 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.16 (Page Supp. 1976).
121 State v. State Aerial Farm Statistics, Inc., No. 75-CR-B-1205 (Newark Mun. Ct.,
October 17, 1975); State v. Commercial Builders & Floor Coverings, Inc., Nos. 32598, 32599,
32600 (Columbus Mun. Ct., October 28, 1975); State v. Kuhn, No. 75 CR-B-590-S (Celina
Mun. Ct., November 4, 1975).
' State v. Happy People's Club, No. 35-299 (Columbus Mun. Ct., November 20, 1975).
' State v. State Aerial Farm Statistics, Inc., No. 75-CR-B-1205 (Newark Mun. Ct.,
October 31, 1975); State v. Commercial Builders & Floor Coverings, Inc., No. 32598, 32600
(Columbus Mun. Ct., March 5, 1976).
112 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.07(E) (Page Supp. 1976).
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eral's Office. Continuing escrow accounts are required to ensure a
source of funds for the resolution of complaints received both before
and after execution of the judgment.
In appropriate cases, the Attorney General's Office has required
suppliers to admit their violations of the Consumer Sales Practices
Act. Admissions have taken various forms, such as acknowledging
the truth of the allegations in the Attorney General's complaint' m
admitting having engaged in the enjoined practices, 34 and admitting
violations of specific provisions of the Act and the substantive rules
of the Department of Commerce." 5
To ensure continuing compliance with consent judgments, the
Office has required various forms of reporting by defendants and the
opportunity to inspect defendants' business records. Forms of report-
ing have included monthly submission of affidavits showing mileage
of all used cars purchased and sold by the defendant in Ohio 36 and
maintenance of a list of the defendant's employees with a verified
statement that each has received, read, and understood the require-
ments of the consent judgment. 7
Whatever a consent judgment or an adjudicated court order
requires, the Section closely monitors the defendant's subsequent
compliance. The force of a court order under the Act is thus strength-
ened by the supplier's awareness that this scrutiny of his actions
might result in the imposition of a $5000 per day civil penalty.' The
Section has brought eighteen contempt actions since enactment of the
Consumer Sales Practices Act, resulting in judgments totalling 1.9
million dollars.
V. CONCLUSION
Since 1972, when the Attorney General was first granted specific
statutory authority, his consumer protection enforcement efforts
have stopped numerous unlawful business practices, resulted in resti-
tution for victimized consumers, and established new and meaning-
ful rights for Ohio's citizens. However, consumer protection in Ohio
'3 Brown v. Smith, No. 75-CIV-1488 (C.P. Columbiana Cty., March 19, 1976).
'" Brown v. Home Educational Service, Inc., No. 72-256 (C.P. Stark Cty., February 24,
1976).
"5 Brown v. DiMatteo, No. 75CV-719 (C.P. Mahoning Cty., November 18, 1975); Brown
v. Community Hearing Service, Inc., No. 75-050582 (C.P. Cuyahoga Cty., December 22,
1975).
"I' Brown v. Herbert Benton Used Cars, Inc., No. 75-CV-09-3961 (C.P. Franklin Cty.,
September 29, 1975).
'3 Brown v. Allied Pest Control, Inc., No. 75-62351 (C.P. Licking Cty., October 6, 1975).
'38 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.07(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1976).
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is still in its infancy, and more must be done. Consumers, business-
men, and the judiciary must become more fully aware of the rights,
obligations, and remedies existing under present Ohio consumer
protection laws. The legislature must reexamine existing laws to
determine and to eliminate deficiencies. Additional legislation is
needed to correct abuses that are not subject to existing law. The
Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Attorney General's
Office will continue to play a necessary role in accomplishing these
tasks.

